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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TROY FORSBERG, et al,

;
])

Appellants,
vs.

;

BOVIS LEND LEASE, INC., et al,

j

Appellees.

Case No. 20070338-CA

)

BRIEF OF APPELLEES

DESCRIPTION OF PARTIES
For the purposes of the Appellees' Brief, the Appellants are organized into
the following four categories: (1) Troy Forsberg, Robert Nicholls, Timothy
McGuire, Leslie Oveson, Dennis Shelton, Michael Gizzi, Merlin Bateman, Frank
Knaus, Joy Watkins, Fred Hansen, Ronald Deppe, Greg Keller, Jason
Lambourne, Jerry Bowman, Michael Caldwell, Harold Dupaix* Shawn Shaw, Jack
Abbott, Toby Winters, Aaron Gaines, Kepper Kennedy, Edward Meyer, Brandon
Miller, Wayne Derbidge, James Winterbottom, Bryan Stoddard, Michael White,
Justin Christensen, Paul Knorr, Marita Stoneking, Viktor Sidenko, John Gualtier,
Leon Nordfors, Lew Kelso, Kenneth Trujillo, John Openshaw, Cory Olsen (the
"Individual Plaintiffs"); (2) Eight District Electrical Benefit Fund, Eighth District
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Electrical Pension Fund Annuity Plan, National Electrical Benefit Fund,
Intermountain NECA and IBEWVacation Trust Fund, IBEW Local Union 354 and
Intermountain NECA and IBEWVacation Trust Fund, IBEW Local Union 354 and
Intermountain Chapter NECA Retirement Benefit Fund, Joint Apprenticeship and
Training Trust Fund, and Labor Management Cooperative Committee (the
"ERISA Trust Funds"); (3) Local Union 354 of the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers (the "Union") and COPE Fund (collectively, the "Union
Plaintiffs"); (4) Administration Fee Fund, and NECA Service Charge
(collectively, the "NECA Funds"). The ERISA Trust Funds, Union Plaintiffs and
the NECA Funds are the only parties currently on appeal. The claims, if any, of
the Individual Plaintiffs are currently "stayed" and remain with the District Court
pending the outcome of this appeal. As such, the ERISA Trust Funds, Union
Plaintiffs and NECA Funds may collectively be referred to as "Appellants".1
Appellee Davis Hospital and Medical Center ("Davis Hospital") is the
owner of the property on which the labor was performed. Davis Hospital
contracted with Appellee Bovis Lend Lease ("Bovis") as general contractor on

1

Bovis Lend Lease and Davis Hospital are mindful of the admonition of Rule
24(d) to minimize the use of general references to Appellant and Appellee. In
this case, with multiple appellants and appellees, the use of the actual names of
all parties appeared to increase rather than decrease confusion in the text, so the
impersonal references are used. In a case with similar parties, the Maryland
Court of Apeals attempted the use of two names for multiple union and trust fund
appellants, (see National Electrical Industry Fund at al v. Bethlehem Steel
Corporation. 463 A.2d 858, 859 (Maryland App. 1983), that approach added
some confusion which Bovis and Davis Hospital respectfully attempt to avoid
here.
3121 03
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the project. Appellee Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of American
("Travelers") is the surety of the Bond to Release Mechanic's Lien. Davis
Hospital, Bovis and Travelers may collectively be referred to as "Appellees".
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This Court should affirm the District Court's decision granting Appellees'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and denying Appellants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. Appellants have asserted a mechanic's lien claim against
the Project. However, the ERISA Trust Funds, the Union Plaintiffs, and the
NECA Funds did not supply any labor or materials to the Project, nor did they
directly add to its value. Therefore, they do not fall within the class of
individuals/entities the Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute was designed to protect and
it should, therefore, not be construed liberally in their favor. Accordingly, the
remedies available under the Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute should not be
extended to the ERISA Trust Funds, the Union Plaintiffs, or the NECA Funds.
Appellants also claim standing to assert a claim under what they describe
as the "Utah Payment Bond Statute," an incorrect reference to the Utah Private
Contractor's Bond Statute. Because Appellants are not laborers who provided
labor which directly improved the property, they are not within the class of
persons who may assert claims under the Utah Private Contractor's Bond
Statute.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Appellants' claims are likewise preempted
by ERISA. ERISA, the federal law relating to employee benefit plans, specifically
3121 03
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preempts state laws when it comes to enforcement and causes of action relating
to these benefit plans. Appellants attempt to use an alternative forum and cause
of action, i.e. Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute, is preempted by ERISA.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Appellants executed various agreements and declarations of trust

setting forth benefit programs, wage assessments and contributions relating to
the Unions. (FoF 1J1 - 6)
2.

Western States Electric, Inc. ("WSE"), a member of a multi-employer

bargaining unit, was signatory to a Collective Bargaining Agreement between the
Union and NECA which required WSE, not Appelless, to pay of all of the benefits
which are being claimed by Appellants. (FoF fl7)
3.

Appellees were not signatory to nor a party to any agreement with

Appellants. (FoF1J8)
4.

Davis Hospital, the owner of the property, contracted with Bovis, as

a general contractor, to construct the expansion of the Davis Hospital in Layton,
Utah (the "Project"). (FoF fl9 and 10)
5.

In or about April 2002, Bovis subcontracted with WSE to perform

certain electrical work on the Project. (FoF fl11)
6.

In or about April 2002, the Union dispatched some of its members to

work as employees of WSE to provide labor on the Project. (FoF 1J12)
7.

WSE had a history of being delinquent on making benefit

contributions and accordingly, on August 26, 2002, the trustees of Appellants

3121 03
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filed a lawsuit against WSE, pursuant to ERISA, seeking payment of delinquent
trust fund contributions through June, 2002, and obtained a judgment against
WSE. (FoFfl3)
8.

Pursuant to the ERISA judgment, the Trustees and the Union

obtained a "Writ of Garnishment," dated January 21, 2003, which required Bovis
to withhold $49,024.09 from Western States' earnings from its work on the
Project. (FoFH14)
9.

Pursuant to this "Writ of Garnishment," the Trustees and the court

issued a "Garnishee Order," dated April 8, 2003, requiring Bovis to pay
$49,024.09 to Attorney Richard W. Perkins to the benefit of the Trustees. (FoF
1115)
10.

In compliance with the Order, Bovis issued payment to Richard W.

Perkins on April 14, 2003, which was credited to WSE's most delinquent
contributions. None of these outstanding contributions paid related to the wages
earned for work performed on the Project. (FoF TJ16 and 17)
11.

Despite its knowledge of WSE's continual delinquency regarding

trust fund contributions, the Union continued dispatching workers to WSE to
perform labor on the Project, did not get a surety bond from WSE as required by
the "Inside Wireman Agreement," and did not terminate their agreement with
WSE. (FoF V 8)
12.

The Individual Plaintiffs who performed electrical work on the Project

were paid by WSE their full hourly wages for their services provided. (FoF 1J19)

3121.03
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13.

The ERISA Trust Funds did not perform any labor and/or services

nor did they provide any materials for the improvement of the property at the
Project. (FoF1f20)
14.

The Union Plaintiffs did not perform any labor and/or services nor did

they provide any materials for the improvement of the property at the Project.
(FoF1f21)
15.

The NECA Funds did not perform any labor and/or services nor did

they provide any materials for the improvement of the property at the Project.
(FoF H22)
16.

The ERISA Trust Funds, Union Plaintiffs and NECA Funds claim that

WSE failed to pay the full amount of contributions and working assessments
required under the collective bargaining agreement or other labor agreements
they had with WSE. (FoF fl23)
17.

WSE filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on or about July 22, 2003, in the

United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, Petition No. 03-32610.
(FoF H24)
18.

On or about December 23, 2003, Plaintiffs, including the ERISA

Trust Funds, Union Plaintiffs and NECA Funds, filed a "Corrected Notice to Hold
and Claim a Lien" against the Project. (FoF fl25)
19.

Pursuant to Utah Code Section 38-1-28, Bovis and Travelers

executed a "Bond to Release Mechanic's Lien," dated June 14, 2004, and
thereafter filed a "Notice of Release of Lien and Substitution of Alternate

3121 03
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Security" which was recorded in the Office of the Davis County Recorder. (FoF
H26 and 27)
ARGUMENT
1.

APPELLANTS DO NOT HAVE STANDING TO MAKE A CLAIM AND/OR
RECOVER EMPLOYEE BENEFIT CONTRIBUTIONS, WAGE
ASSESSMENTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER THE UTAH
MECHANICS' LIEN OR PRIVATE CONTRACTOR'S BOND STATUTES
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
A.
APPELLANTS DO NOT HAVE STANDING TO PURSUE CLAIMS
UNDER THE UTAH MECHANICS' LIEN STATUTE.
i.
Appellants do not have standing to file a lien in this
matter because they did not supply any labor or materials to the
Project nor did they directly add value to the Project.
Appellants allege that they have standing to file a lien in this matter.

Appellants support this assertion by simply quoting Section 38-1-3 of the Utah
Mechanics' Lien Act which defines those who are entitled to lien. Appellants then
state that the purpose of the Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute "is to protect laborers
who have added value to the property of others." (Brief of Appellants at 11 - 12)
However, the ERISA Trust Funds, the Union Plaintiffs and the NECA
Funds are not laborers. The language of the statutes and the analysis set forth in
a long line of Utah Supreme Court cases leave no doubt that a laborer is a
person who actually performs labor. The purpose of Utah's mechanic's lien law".
.. manifestly has been to protect. .. those who perform labor and furnish the
materials which enter into the construction of a building or other
improvement." John Wagner Assoc, v. Hercules, Inc.. 797 P.2d 1123, 1125

3121.03
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(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added) (quoting Rio Grande Lumber Co., v.
Darke. 167 P. 241, 244, (Utah 1917)). Utah law defines those entitled to file a lien
by stating "[t]he purpose of a mechanics' lien act is remedial in nature and seeks
to provide protection to laborers and materialmen who have added directly to
the value of the property of another by their materials or labor." Calder Bros.
Co. v. Anderson. 652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added): see also
Davis v. Barrett, 467 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah 1970) (holding that the purpose of
Utah's Lien Law is". . . to protect those who have added directly to the value of
real property by performing labor or furnishing material"). Moreover, "[f]or work to
add to the value of the property it is necessary that the work benefit the specific
property in question." Rotta v. Hawk, 756 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The significance of this precise language, with its emphasis on a person
directly performing labor, is clear. Ninety years of Utah case law leaves no doubt
that, in accordance with the terms of the statute, a mechanic's lien is intended to
protect only those who directly add to the value of a property by personally
performing labor and or supply the material. The statute does not apply to entities
that do not actually perform labor or supply materials, even if they speculatively
confer some indirect or remote benefit to a project.
Thus, because Appellants supplied no labor or materials to the project,
they did not benefit the Project directly in any way and did nothing to add to its
value. (FoF fflf 20, 21 and 22) This is further confirmed by Appellants as set
forth in paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs Statement of Uncontested Facts in their

3121.03
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Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment wherein they
acknowledge that some of the funds which they have liened for are to the benefit
of "other industry employees" who did not work on the Project. (R. 275)
Appellants did not provide labor and/or materials to the Project. (FoF 20, 21 and
22) It is undisputed that Appellants did no work that constituted "construction,
alteration, or improvement" to the Project as required by Utah Code Section 381-3. Accordingly, to hold that general "services" offered by Appellants solely for
the welfare of the union members, including member not working on the Project,
could be translated into direct value added to the Project would contradict the
well-settled principle that a party filing a mechanic's lien must be a person who
directly added value to a specific property through providing labor or materials.
Therefore, Appellants are not within the class of those protected and are,
therefore, precluded from filing and foreclosing a mechanic's lien under Utah's
Mechanic's Lien Statute.2

2

Other state courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g.. ChestnutAdams Limited P'ship v. Bricklayers and Masons Plaintiffs of Boston. Mass.. 612
N.E.2d 236, 240 (Mass. 1993) ("Normally, a mechanic's . . . lien on property is
not awarded to trustees of employee benefit funds simply because the benefit
funds did not provide the material or the labor for the construction of that
property").
3121.03
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ii.
Appellants should not be afforded a liberal application of
Utah's Mechanic's Lien Statute because they are not within the
purview of individuals it was intended to protect and are not
listed in the statute as entities entitled to foreclose a
mechanic's lien.
Appellants also argue that they have standing because the Utah's
Mechanic's Lien Statute "has been liberally construed." That argument fails
because the Appellants fail to distinguish between the concepts of a liberal
construction of enforcement provisions for those intended to be included under
the protection of the statute and a narrow and strict construction of limits on the
scope of persons to whom that protection is intended to extend.
In Stanton Transportation Company v. Davis, 341 P.2d 207, 210, (Utah
1959) the Utah Supreme Court analyzes the issue of construing statutes liberally
in the context of mechanic's liens by stating:
While it is true that our statutes are to be liberally
construed to give effect to their purpose and to promote
justice, it is equally true that they should not be distorted
beyond the intent of the legislature. This principle is
particularly applicable in a situation of this kind where a liability
is imposed upon the property owner beyond what he
contracted to bear for the improvement of his property. In
order to impose upon him such additional burdens the law
must clearly spell out the responsibility. Otherwise, the
entering into a contract for the improvement of one's property
might open the door to unforeseeable risks for the property
owner. He is aware of the amount of work to be done upon his
property and fairly may be charged with knowledge of the
extent thereof. But that is not true of peripheral work that may

3121 03
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be in some remote way related to the contractor's activities.3
(emphasis added)
Thus, while the Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute is generally construed liberally to
protect "those who enhance the value of a property by supplying labor or
materials," Interiors Contracting Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah
1982), it should not be liberally construed in favor of the "peripheral" ERISA Trust
Funds, Union Plaintiffs, or NECA Funds. Such a conclusion would distort its
application beyond the intent of the legislature.
The foregoing analysis is consistent with Edwards v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 517 N.E.2d 430, 432 (Ind. App. 1988), wherein the court held that fringe
benefit funds were not entitled to file a mechanic's lien. ]d. at 432. In Edwards, a
general contractor entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a local
union, obligating itself to make contributions to various trust funds on behalf of
union workers. |g\ at 431. While working on a project, the general contractor
became delinquent on its benefit contributions and thereafter filed for bankruptcy.
Id. The union, its members and the fringe benefit funds filed a lien against the
*

owner of the project under the applicable mechanic's lien statute. The statute
provided that in order to file a lien, the party must be a contractor, subcontractor,
laborer, or any other person providing materials or furnishing labor to a
construction project. Id. at 431-432. The court reasoned that pursuant to the
3

Appellees wish to point out that although Stanton was abrogated, the Utah
Supreme Court quoted this language in Graco, 766 P.2d at 1079, thereby
ensuring its validity.
3121.03

11

mechanic's lien statute, the class of individuals entitled to file such an action is
"to be strictly construed." Id. at 432. The court thereafter held that neither the
union nor the fringe benefit funds were classified as contractors or
subcontractors and that they did not "otherwise fit within the class of persons or
entities entitled to raise and foreclose a mechanic's lien [because] they furnished
neither labor nor materials." j d
Further, the court in Edwards states,
In Indiana the mechanic's lien statutes are in derogation of the
common law and the provisions of such statutes which relate
to the creation, existence or class of individuals entitled to
such a lien are to be strictly construed [but] once the lien has
attached, provisions relating to the enforcement should be
liberally construed to effect the remedial purposes of the
statute.
Id at 432.
Thus, contrary to Appellants' conclusion, while Indiana liberally construes
the enforcement provisions of its mechanic's lien statute, it strictly construes
limits on the scope of those who are protected and does not allow individuals or
entities who are not within a class the statute was designed to protect to take
advantage of its remedies.
This analysis was also followed by our sister state of Colorado in Ridge
Erection. Co. v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 549 P.2d 408
(Colo. App. 1976). The statute at issue in that case allowed persons supplying
equipment or materials to a project, along with contractors, subcontractors,
builders, materialmen, mechanics and individuals of all classes who performed
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labor on a particular project to file a mechanic's lien, kt at 411. The court held
that prior to the statute's amendment, trustees of employee trust funds were
"conspicuously absent" from that list and therefore did not have standing to file a
mechanic's lien, ig\ In holding that trustees of employee trust funds were not
entitled to file a mechanic's lien prior to the amendment of the state's mechanic's
lien statute, the court stated,
Since the underlying principle of our mechanic's lien law is to
prevent unjust enrichment, it is usually liberally construed in
favor of lien claimants, but the statutory remedy cannot be
judicially extended so as to be applied to cases which do
not fall within its provisions. And, where the object of a
statute is to charge the property of one with the debt of
another, persons claiming its benefits must bring themselves
clearly within its purview as belonging to some class in whose
favor the remedy is allowed, (emphasis added)
549P.2dat410.
Thus, Colorado, like Indiana, recognizes that before a mechanic's
lien statute can be liberally construed, a party making a claim under its
provisions must come within the statute's "purview."
Our Supreme Court developed a similar rule in AAA Fencing Co. v.
Raintree Dev.. 714 P.2d 289 (Utah 1986). Appellants relied on this case for their
conclusion that the Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute is to be liberally construed.
However, Appellants fail to acknowledge the limitations articulated in Raintree
Dev. Specifically, the court stated, "Although liens and pleadings arising under
[Utah's Mechanic's Lien Statute] will be liberally construed to effect the desired
object, compliance with the statute is required before a party is entitled to the
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benefits created by the statute." Raintree Dev., 714 P.2d at 291. Protection of
laborers and materialmen who directly added work or materials to a project is the
"desired object," and a threshold issue of compliance with the statute is that a
claimant be among those whom the legislature intended to protect.
More recently, this court followed the Raintree Dev. principle by stating,
"Once the narrow requirements of the mechanics' lien statutes have been met,
the general policy of Utah courts is to construe the statutes broadly to protect
those who enhance the value of property by supplying labor or materials." First
General Services v. Perkins. 918 P.2d 480, 486 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis
added).
Thus, Utah's Mechanic's Lien Statute is liberally construed only after the
"narrow requirements" of the statute have been complied with. While Raintree
Dev. and Perkins addressed whether a lien foreclosure action was brought within
the statutory time period and attorney's fees pursuant to a lien foreclosure action
respectively, the rule of statutory compliance with Utah's Mechanic's Lien Statute
articulated in those cases is applicable to the case at bar. Specifically, the
ERISA Trust Funds, the Union Plaintiffs, and the NECA Funds failed to comply
with one of the essential requirements necessary for filing a lien - they did not
supply labor or materials to the Project and did nothing to contribute to its
"construction, alteration, or improvement." (FoF ffi]20, 21 and 22). Therefore, in
accordance with the required initial narrow construction of the Utah Mechanics'
Lien Statute, it is clear that Appellants are not entitled to avail themselves of the
312103
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benefits conferred in this statue and accordingly, do not have standing to pursue
the present action.
Appellees acknowledge that the Individual Plaintiffs, as individuals who
provided labor to the Project, may have standing to file a lien and foreclosure
action for unpaid wages for the work performed. However, the Individual
Plaintiffs are not seeking unpaid wages. It is undisputed that the Individual
Plaintiffs have been paid all of their actual wages for their work on the Project.
(FoF 1J19) It is in reality the ERISA Trust Funds, the Union Plaintiffs and the
NECA Funds that are attempting to use the Individual Plaintiffs names in an
attempt to access remedies not available to them under Utah law. The damages
sought by Appellants are not wages at all. The sole claims being made are for
unpaid contributions and assessments which are not considered wages.
Even if the law was unclear, the facts make it clear that the Appellants
acknowledged and agreed that the benefits are not wages due the workers. For
example, the "Agreement and Declaration of Trust of the I.B.E.W. Local Union
354 and Intermountain Chapter NECA Retirement Benefit Fund" and the
"Restated Agreement and Declaration of Trust of the Intermountain NECA and
I.B.E.W. Vacation Trust Fund" each state, "Contributions to the Fund shall not
constitute nor be deemed to be wages due to the Employees with respect to
whose work such payments are made." See R. 361 - 2, Exhibit "B" and R. 405,
Exhibit "C". These non-wage claims are not allowed under the Utah Mechanics'
Lien Statute.
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Appellants also argue in their brief that they have standing to enforce their
mechanic's lien claim under the Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute based on United
States v. Carter. 353 U.S. 210 (1957), an interpretation of the federal Miller Act in
a public construction contract. Carter has no application here. Unlike Carter, this
is a private construction project and there are no federal or state public contract
statutes implicated.4
However, Carter is also factually distinguishable from the instant case, and
would not apply even if this were a public contractor's bond case. In Carter, the
defaulting contractor against whom the employee benefit funds sought a claim
under the Miller Act was signatory to the collective bargaining agreement that
obligated it to make benefit contributions to said funds. Under those facts and
circumstances, the defaulting contractor was held liable for the benefit
contributions. The facts and circumstances are different here. Appellees are not
signatories to any collective bargaining agreement and are not obligated to make
benefit contributions to any of Appellants. (FoF TJ8) Moreover, Appellees paid
their contractual obligations j n full with respect to the Project.5
Further, if the Utah Legislature intended for entities like Appellants to be
protected by the Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute, it would have expressly made
mention of such an intent. In R.A. McKell Excavating. Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank.
4

The legal inapplicability of the Miller Act generally and Carter in particular are
discussed further in section I.B, pages 32-33 infra.
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N A . 100 P.3d 1159 (Utah 2004) (quoting Evans v. State. 963 P.2d 177, 184
(Utah 1998), our Supreme Court, in interpreting the language of the Utah
Mechanics' Lien Statute, stated that "our primary goal is to give effect to the
legislature's intent in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." The
Utah Supreme Court also stated in A.K.& R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v.
Guv. 2004 UT 48 If 24, 94 P.3d 270, 276 (Utah 2004), that the unequivocal
"purpose of the mechanic's lien is to protect those whose labor or materials have
enhanced the value of property."
Under the law, the Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute simply does not afford
protection to parties who may have a remote involvement in a project, but only
those who personally provided actual labor or materials which directly added to
the value of the property. This point is further evidenced in the court's rationale in
Graco Fishing and Rental Tools. Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc.. 766 P.2d
1074 (Utah 1988), wherein the Utah Supreme Court overruled Stanton
Transportation. 341 P.2d 207, which held that rental charges were not in the
purview of eligible lien rights because Section 38-1-3 did not expressly reference
rental equipment. In Graco. the Utah Supreme Court concluded that because
the Utah Legislature amended Section 38-1-3 subsequent to the ruling in Stanton
to expressly include lien rights for rental equipment, Stanton was no longer good
law. Thus, based on Stanton and Graco. it is clear that the Utah Legislature's
5

Appellants do not allege that Bovis Lend Lease, as general contractor, did not
pay Western States Electric in full, nor do they allege that Davis Hospital, as
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intends that Section 38-1-3 be strictly construed and apply only to those
specifically listed therein.
This conclusion is consistent with the analysis set forth in Ridge Erection
Co. v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.. 549 P.2d 408 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1976). The Colorado court held that unpaid fringe benefit contributions do
not constitute value for labor furnished on a project and the trustees of such
funds are not eligible to file a mechanic's lien. The court ruled that the rights of
trustees for unpaid contributions were "conspicuously absent" from the list of
parties entitled to a lien, kL at 411. The court concluded that due to the
legislature's subsequent inclusion of the provision granting certain trustees of
employee benefit funds mechanic's lien rights, the former statute governing in
this case and its failure to explicitly enumerate such rights of trustees indicates
that the legislature did not intend for trustees of employee benefit funds to have
lien rights prior to the statute's amendment. kL
Similar to the Colorado statute in Ridge Erection. Utah Code Section 38-13 enumerates the classes of claimants entitled to file a mechanic's lien.
Specifically, it provides that "Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons
performing any services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment used
in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any building . . . and licensed
architects and engineers and artisans" may file a mechanic's lien. Thus, like the
Colorado statute in Ridge Erection, the ERISA Trust Funds, the Union Plaintiffs,

owner of the property, failed to make payment in full to Bovis Lend Lease.
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and the NECA Funds are "conspicuously absent" from Section 38-1-3. If the
Utah Legislature intended for remote entities that did not perform any labor or did
not supply any materials to be able to file a mechanic's lien, it would have
included an express provision providing for their relief. Furthermore, "Mechanic's
liens are purely statutory, and lien claimants may only acquire a lien by
complying with the statutory provisions authorizing them." Projects Unlimited,
Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co.. 798 P.2d 738 (Utah 1990). Thus,
because there has been no express manifestation of legislative intent to allow
entities such as Appellants to file and foreclose a mechanic's lien, they are not
"authorized" to do so and their claim must fail as a matter of law.
The reliance Appellants place on cases from other jurisdictions is
misplaced given the specific details of those holdings. For example, Appellants
offer Performance Funding v. Arizona Pipe Trade Trust Funds. 49 P.3d 293 (Ariz.
App. 2002). That ruling was based on a "long tradition of liberally construing
[Arizona] lien statutes to insure that laborers receive their bargained for benefits."
Moreover, the facts of Performance Funding are not analogous to those of this
case, and the Performance Funding court suggested that it might have found
differently with different facts. The court noted: "Preliminarily, as the successor
to Industrial, Performance's status in this case is more analogous to that of a
defaulting contractor than a third-party owner." jd. Here, the claim against Bovis
is not against a defaulting contractor, and the claim against Davis Hospital is yet
another step further removed from the (fourth-party) property owner.
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Appellants also mischaracterize National Electrical Industry Fund v.
Bethlehem Steel Corporation. 463 A.2d 858 (Maryland App. 1983). Appellants
cite that case for a holding that fringe benefit contributions are part of the "value
of service rendered." (Appellant's Brief at 12). That was not the issue in
Bethlehem Steel nor was it the holding. The issue, rather, was whether
individual workers could be viewed as subcontractors. 463 A.2d at 860-861.
Appellants also incorrectly assert, without citation or discussion, that the
Maryland Court of Appeals "held that the Union had standing to enforce its
mechanic's lien based upon Federal labor law." (Appellant's Brief at 13). The
Maryland court said only that "payments to the Trusts are recognized as
beneficial to the workers by federal labor law." 463 A.2d at 863.
Appellants also contend they have standing to sue for the unpaid
contributions or assessments by summarily stating that they have been assigned
or effectively assigned the right to sue by the Individual Plaintiffs or that the
claims are for the benefit of the Individual Plaintiffs. Appellants reference cases
in which various iterations of trust or benefit funds have been allowed to claim as
assignees but, in all of those cases, the workers were not themselves individual
claimants. Indeed, Appellants are making a claim and seeking benefit for "other
industry employees" wholly unconnected with the Project. Whatever the legal
arguments for an abstract right of employees to assign their claims, the fact is
that they have not done so in this case. The individual employees are named
individual plaintiffs in their own right, and are making their own claims. In United
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States ex rel United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners v. Woerfel
Corporation. 545 F.2d 1148, 1151 (8th Circuit 1976), a case asking whether
unions could make claims under the public contractor's bond statute, the Eighth
Circuit found:
The remedial objective of the Miller Act is to insure payment for
services rendered by a laborer or subcontractor on a government
project. A collective bargaining contract, even where one is signed,
is not a contract for the performance of services;it governs only the
general rules of conduct between employer and employee. The
right to the payment of money in this case remains with the
individual employees, for it is they, not the unions, who performed
the services. In short, the unions are not "unpaid creditors" of the
Woerfel Corporation. The unions have cited no authority, and
independent research has turned up no authority, permitting unions
to sue under the Miller Act absent assignments from the employees
who performed the services. We decline to do so here.
id. 545F.2dat1151.
In summary, Appellants clearly do not fall within the class of individuals
whom the Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute was designed to protect. They added
nothing to the Project. They undisputedly did not perform any labor on the
Project nor did they supply any materials which entered into its construction.
(FoF fflf 20, 21 and 22) Thus, this Court should follow the precedent of the Utah
cases it has followed to date, as well as the sound rationale of cases from other
states and find Appellants are ineligible to file and foreclose on a mechanic's lien
in this matter.
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B.
APPELLANTS DO NOT HAVE STANDING TO PURSUE CLAIMS
UNDER THE UTAH PRIVATE CONTRACTOR'S BOND STATUTE.
Appellants claim standing under a nonexistent "Utah Payment Bond
Statute" and attempt to frame the decision for this Court in terms of whether the
"Utah Payment Bond Statute" should be interpreted in a manner consistent with
the 1957 ruling in United States v. Carter, a case interpreting the Miller Act. That
characterization is legally and factually flawed and must fail. Appellants
persistently use the phrase "Utah Payment Bond Statute." There is no Utah
statute with that name, nor is this a purely semantic point of inartful drafting or of
the correct name for a single statute. Utah law provides two quite distinct
statutes, a Public Contractor's Bond Statute, and a Private Contractor's Bond
Statute. Appellants commingle the two into some'legal composite of their own
invention, relying on cases interpreting public contractor's bond statutes and
making arguments which ignore both the fact that this was a private construction
project and the law in Utah regarding interpretation of the relevant statutes, the
Mechanic's Lien and Private Contractor's Bond Statutes.
Courts interpreting these statutes make a clear distinction between the
two. To the extent the line of federal cases interpreting the Miller Act would have
any relevance to Utah contractor bond cases, that relevance would be only with
respect to public contractor bond statutes, those which have been referred to in
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state laws as "Little Miller Act" statutes.6 The question before this Court is not the
interpretation of Utah's public contractor bond statute, it is the very different
matter of interpretation of the Utah private contractor bond statute.7
The cases in Utah and those of other states which focus on the distinction
between the private contractor bond statute and the public contractor bond
statute offer adequate and compelling guidance. The similarity between the
private contractor bond and mechanic's lien statutes in Utah, and parallel
similarities in other states, compel a narrow interpretation of the scope of the
Private Contractor's Bond statute and a narrow view of the class of claimants the
legislature intended to benefit.
Utah law is clear that interpretations of the private contractor bond statute
are not guided by similarity to the public contractors bond statute, but rather by
similarity to the mechanic's lien statute. The Utah Supreme Court has clearly
stated that the private contractor's bond statute and the mechanic's lien statute
share a common purpose. Johnson v. Galleqos Construction Company. 785
P.2d 1109, 1111 (Utah 1990). Our Supreme Court analyzes the scope of their
applicability similarly. Id. at 1112. In Graco. the court found:
The contractor's bond statute and the mechanic's lien statute have
the same purpose and contain similar provisions and language.
This Court has established the general rule that "because of the
6

Utah adopted a "Little Miller Act" statute in 1963. It was repealed in 1980. See
discussion at page 27 infra.
7
The private contractor's bond statute language protects "[a] person who has
furnished labor, services, equipment, or material in the prosecution of the work
provided for in the commercial contract." Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-4 (2004).
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common purpose of these lien and contractor's bond statutes, and
their practically identical language, adjudication as to what is
lienable under the former are helpful in determining the proper
application of the latter."
Id- at 1078 (quoting King Bros.. Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co.. 374 P.2d 254, 255-56
(Utah 1962)).
Although Appellants correctly state the general proposition that Utah
liberally construes the mechanics' lien statute, the cases are clear that the
contours of that liberal construction are limited. It is the protections afforded to
those who come within the purview of the statute which is liberally construed, not
the universe of those who are so protected. As noted above, in Stanton
Transportation Company v. Davis. 341 P.2d 207 (Utah 1959), overruled on other
grounds, Graco Fishing and Rental Tools. Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration. 766 P.2d
1074 (Utah 1988), the court explicitly found limits to the liberal construction of the
mechanics' lien statute:
While it is true that our statutes are to be liberally
construed to give effect to their purpose and to promote
justice, it is equally true that they should not be
distorted beyond the intent of the legislature.
341 P.2d 207, 210 (emphasis added).
Although subsequently overruled, the court's articulation of legislative
intent as a limit on liberal statutory construction generally remains valid, as does
the court's acknowledgment of the applicability of some limits on liberal
construction of the mechanics' lien statute specifically. The Graco court did not
overrule Stanton because it felt that it had previously reached an incorrect legal
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conclusion about the contours of the mechanics' lien statute, rather it overruled
Stanton because, subsequent to the decision in Stanton, the Utah Legislature
amended Section 38-1-3 for the express purpose of including lien rights for rental
equipment.
As the court wrote in Stanton, the legislature "must clearly spell out the
responsibility." Legislators were faced with an opportunity to do so in response
to Stanton, and their amendment was enacted with the benefit of the court's
instruction. Had the legislature interpreted the statute to already provide for any
claims "justly due" by any parties having a connection to the construction,
however remote or near, it would have said so.
In Johnson v. Galleqos. following Graco, the court again rejected an
expansive definition of "labor and materials" in construing the reach of the
language of the bond statute. 785 P.2d at 1111-1112.
These questions were addressed recently by this court in 2005 in Robert
Pearson Construction v. Lamb. 121 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 2005). The court found
"the purpose of the mechanic's lien act is remedial in nature and seeks to provide
protection to laborers and materialmen who have added directly to the value of
the property of another by their materials or labors." 121 P.2d at 717(emphasis
added). Significantly, the court also recognized that the Utah Mechanics' Lien
statute was "passed primarily to protect laborers who have added value to the
property of another, but also to protect the property owner's right to convey clear
title." 121 P.2dat719-720.

3121 03

25

This echos the reasoning of Stanton in 1959, that there is a balance
intended by the statute in which the relief available under the mechanics' lien
statute (and the Private Contractor's Bond statute) must have limits. That
balance requires that the statute be enforceable only by those workers
enumerated in the statute who have provided improvement to a property, and
only to the extent that payments are for work performed. Claims of entities not
enumerated in the statute, and amounts intended either for the potential but
speculative benefit of any individual worker, as well as amounts intended for the
broader benefit of others who did not perform work on the project, are not within
the express language of the statute and are not consistent with legislative intent.
Appellants offer no Utah case rejecting or limiting the analytical approach
first articulated in King Brothers, subsequently in Graco and in Johnson, and
more recently in Pearson.
Appellants argue that the most applicable precedent is Western Coating.
Inc. v. Gibbons & Reed Company. 788 P.2d 503 (Utah 1990). They offer
Western Coating in support of their assertion " . . . . federal precedents under the
Miller Act provide persuasive authority in interpreting the provisions of the Utah
Procurement A c t . . . . " (Brief of Appellants at 16). However true that may be, it
is irrelevant because this case is not about the Utah Procurement Act or the
associated Public Contractor's Bond Statute.
Even with respect to the public contractor's bond statute, Western Coating
does not establish that Utah follows the exact language of the Miller Act. To the
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contrary, it establishes that although the Miller Act was substantially adopted by
Utah in 1963, and indeed referred to in Utah law as the "Little Miller Act," the
legislature repealed the Little Miller Act in 1980. See, 788 P.2d at 505. At that
time, Utah joined four other states in replacing the statutory adoption of the Miller
Act with provisions of the ABA Model Procurement Code. jd. Western Coating,
in declining to adopt an expansive view of the public contractor's bond statute,
found that when the Legislature rewrote the statute in 1980, they rejected a
broad reading of the Miller Act in favor of the more restrictive provisions of the
ABA Model Code. Id.
Although Western Coating is not a private contractor's bond statute case,
there is an error in the opinion which should be illuminated to avoid confusion.
Justice Howe, citing King Brothers, wrote: "This Court has recognized that public
bonding and mechanic's lien statutes are 'closely related in purpose.'" 788 P.2d
at 503 (citing 374 P.2d 254, 255 (Utah 1962)). The error is that King Brothers, as
discussed above, was a case about the similarity between the private
contractor's bond statute and mechanic's lien statute. King Brothers is a short
case with explicit references to the private bond statute, with no ambiguity in the
language, but beyond that the error is self-proving in that King Brothers was
decided in 1962, and Western Coating explains that the public contractor's bond
statute was not enacted until 1963.
The cases from other states are likewise inconsistent with the Appellants'
argument. For example, in Indiana Carpenters Central and Western Indiana
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Pension Fund v. Seaboard Surety Company. 601 N.E.2d 352 (Indiana App.
1992), the court references "the logic of Carter" in discussing the public
contractor's bond statute, but then rejects the application of that logic to the
private contractor's bond statute in Indiana. See. 601 N.E.2d 352, 355-356. The
court made a clear distinction between the public contractor's bond statute and
claims under a private mechanic's lien. ]g\ The court noted, pursuant to
Edwards v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.. 517 N.E.2d 430 (1988) "a union pension
fund did not have standing to file a mechanic's lien in Indiana because
pension funds do not provide labor or materials." 601 N.E.2d at 356
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Likewise, the Colorado Supreme Court makes reference to the relevance
of Carter for interpreting Miller Act cases, but clearly distinguishes the language
of the mechanic's lien statute and the public contractor's bond statute. Trustees
of Colorado Carpenters and Millwrights Health Benefit Trust Fund v. Pinkard
Construction. Co.. 604 P.2d 683, 685 (Colorado 1979).
This court is faced with the same statutory situation as that which faced the
Indiana and Colorado courts. The legislature did not specifically provide for lien
rights for trustees of benefit funds, and statutory construction leads to the logical
conclusion the legislature would have explicitly established such rights had that
been its intent. Therefore, until the Utah Legislature amends Section 38-1-3 to
include lien rights for benefit funds or their trustees, it is only logical for Utah to
follow the precedent of the Utah Supreme Court and the courts of other states
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which have declined to adopt an expansive reading of the scope of the
mechanics' lien statute and, by analogy, the Private Contractor's Bond statute.
Appellants provide, without analysis, a string of cases in which federal or
state courts "followed Carter in allowing employee benefit trust funds to recover
unpaid contributions under contractor's bond statutes." (Brief of Appellant at 18)
However, not one of these cases involves the interpretation of a private
contractor's bond statute.
Trustees of Colorado Carpenters and Millwrights health Benefit Trust Fund
v. Pinkard Construction Co.. 604 P.2d 683 (Colorado 1980), is not a private
contractor's bond case. Rather, it is a public contractor's bond case, and
perhaps most significantly it is a case in which the Colorado Supreme Court
affirms the need for explicit legislative pronouncement if unpaid fringe benefits
are to be included in the definition of "the value of labor done." ]d. 604 P.2d at
685.
In United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Arizona State Carpenters. 584
P.2d 60 (Ariz. App. 1978), the Arizona Supreme. Court explicitly declined to
address whether"... union trusts would be entitled to assert a statutory
mechanic's lien against the owner of the property where the construction
occurred." Id. 584 P.2d at 62. The Arizona court did not " . . . find it necessary
to reach the issue of whether the union trust funds could assert a lien against the
owner of the property." Id. 584 P.2d at 63.
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Indiana Carpenters Central and Western Indiana Pension Fund v.
Seaborad Surety Company. 601 N.E. 2d 352 (Ind. APP. 1992) is not a private
contractor's bond case. Rather, it is a public contractor's bond case in which the
court made a noteworthy distinction ignored by the Appellants in the present
case. The court drew a clear policy distinction between public contractor's bond
statutes and private contractor's bond statutes, suggesting that the Court would
have ruled the other way had the case been brought under a private bond
statute. See 601 NE.2d 352, 356 (Indiana App. 1992)("a mechanic's lien
provides relief to laborers which is in direct conflict with the rights of a
landowner").
Omaha Construction Indus. Pension Plan v. Children's Hospital, 642
N.W.2d 849 (Neb. 1995). is neither a public contractor's bond nor a private
contractor's bond case. Rather, it is a mechanic's lien case in which the court
considered the question of whether the claims of individual workers may be
deemed assigned to the union benefit funds where the workers themselves are
not individual named plaintiffs, id. at 852.
Divane v. Smith. 774 N.E.2d 361 (Illinois App. 2002), is not a private
contractor's bond case. Rather, it is a lien against public project funds case and
does not address a private contractor's bond statute. The question in this case
was whether employees who actually performed work on a public project could
be considered to have assigned their claims to a union for purposes of a lien
against public funds. Id- 774 N.E.2d at 366.
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Appellants also argue that "even jurisdictions that have denied recovery to
employee benefit funds under mechanic's lien statutes have permitted such
recovery under bond statutes." (Brief of Appellant at 18) This statement once
again glosses over an essential distinction in referring generally to "bond
statutes." The two states in which Appellants claim the funds have been allowed
to recover where they could not recover under a mechanic's lien are cases in
which the public contractor's bond statute is at issue. As Indiana Carpenters
clearly stated, the trust funds had standing under the public bond statute
because they did not have standing under the mechanic's lien statute. In other
words, the cases stand for the proposition that recovery under public bond
statutes by trust funds is allowed as a matter of policy because recovery under a
mechanic's lien statute is prohibited by law in those states, not, as the Appellants
imply, despite that prohibition.
Raqan v. Tri-Countv Excavating. Inc.. 62 F.3d 501 (3rd Cir. 1995),
mentions the Miller Act as a basis for a Pennsylvania State Court decision on
piercing the corporate veil in alter-ego arguments which appear in Pennsylvania
bond claim cases, id. 62 F.3d at 509. The Raqan court mentioned Carter and
the Miller Act not in deciding whether trust funds have standing under private
contractor's bond statutes, but only in the narrow context of a notice limitation of
the Miller Act which is similar to the language in the particular bond sold by
Hartford requiring that those who are in contact with subcontractors (but are not
themselves subcontractors) must give notice within 90 days. The reference to
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the Miller Act was with respect to distinctions between first tier and second tier
subcontractors for purposes of lien notice. Nothing in Raqan addressed the
interpretation of any private contractor's bond statute or indeed of any state
public contractor's bond statute.
Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing and Heating Corp., 68 F.3d 561 (2nd Cir.
1995), is a subject matter jurisdiction case in which the Second Circuit found that
the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a plumbing industry
association surety bond claim. ]d. 68 F.3d 561 at 567. The opinion offers
nothing relevant to an analysis of the Utah Private Contractor's Bond Statute.
Operating Engineers Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. JWJ Contracting
Company, 135 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1998), held that the district court properly
dismissed a Miller Act claim for lack of jurisdiction. The case, arising in Arizona,
is not a private contractor's bond statute case. Rather, it is a question of state
and municipal parking and street construction in which claims were brought
under the federal Miller Act and the state "Little Miller Act." Id- 135 F.3d 671,
675-676.
Although United States v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210 (1957), is not relevant to
the interpretation of the Utah Private Contractor's Bond statute, the extent to
which the subsequent line of federal cases distinguish Carter illuminates an
important point. The Carter Court was interpreting the language of the federal
Miller Act, not the language of any state statute or any other federal statute.
Carter does not establish that benefits contributions are always included as
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wages or the value of labor. Just two years after Carter, the Court in Embassy
Restaurant explained that its opinion in Carter was that the trustees might
recover because the Miller Act had the "broad protective purposes of securing all
claims that are justly due." United States v. Embassy Restaurant, 359 U.S. 29,
35 (1959). The Court subsequently explained that it did not intend that benefits
contributions be seen as "wages . .. due to workmen." ]dL
A more recent U.S. Supreme Court case is particularly instructive. In
1983, the Court found that employer contributions to union trust funds are not
included in the term "wages" for purposes of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act. Morrison-Knudson Construction Company v.
Director, OWCP. 461 U.S. 624 (1983). While the case, deciding whether the
employer's contributions to union trust funds should be included in compensation
to be paid to an employee of a construction company fatally injured on his
construction job, is neither an interpretation of the Utah Mechanics' Lien statute
nor the Miller Act, it is instructive on the question of the scope of what constitutes
compensation for labor. The Court wrote:
The present value of these trust funds is not, however, so easily
converted into a cash equivalent. .. . The employer's cost is
irrelevant in this context; it measures neither the employee's benefit
nor his compensation. It does not measure the benefit to the
employee because his family could not take [the benefit contribution]
to the open market to purchase private policies offering similar
benefits to the group policies administered by the union's trustees...
. Nor can the value of the funds be measured by the employee's
expectation interest in them, for that interest is at best speculative.
Id. at 631-632.
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This analysis underscores an important distinction. By its explicit wording,
the Utah Private Contractor's Bond statute is intended to protect those who
actually furnish labor for the improvement of a project, and interpretations of the
statute which would allow others to enforce greater interests should not be
allowed. Anything that is speculative and is not susceptible of calculation as
compensation to the individual worker who performed work on the project is not
within the scope of the statute. Even if the Appellants did have standing as
claimants, contributions to union trust funds in the present case should not be
considered as compensation to individual workers for purposes of the Utah
Private Contractor's Bond statute because they are too speculative and too
remote. As acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Morrison-Knudson, "United
States ex. rel. Sherman v. Carter is not to the contrary." 461 U.S. 324, 631.

2.

THE ERISA TRUST FUNDS' MECHANIC'S LIEN CLAIM IS
PREEMPTED BY ERISA
A.

THE ERISA TRUST FUNDS' CLAIM UNDER UTAH'S
MECHANIC'S LIEN STATUTE "RELATES TO" AND IS,
THEREFORE, PREEMPTED BY ERISA

ERISA provides for the federal administration of employee benefit plans.
Section 1144(a) of ERISA states, in relevant part, "[T]he provisions of this
subchapter... shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of
this title . . . ." Moreover, the underlying purpose of ERISA's preemption clause
i s " . . . to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform
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administration of employee benefit plans." New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 646 (1995).
Claims made pursuant to a state's mechanic's lien statute are preempted
by ERISA because said claims "relate to" and are based in ERISA. Int'l
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 46 v. Trig Electric Constr.
Co., 13 P.3d 622 (Wash. 2000). In Trig Electric, a general contractor engaged in
the construction of a public building hired a subcontractor to perform the
electrical work on the project. ] d at 623. The subcontractor had a collective
bargaining agreement with the plaintiff union obligating it to contribute a portion
of the workers' compensation to benefit-providing trust funds "falling under the
ambit of ERISA." ] d The subcontractor became delinquent on its contributions.
The plaintiff union filed a lien against the general contractor's statutory retainage
account. This account sets aside a portion of the money to be paid to the
general contractor for the protection of those who performed labor on the
respective project. Laborers may file a mechanic's lien against the account for
unpaid compensation earned, i d at 623-625. The court held that union trust
funds were preempted from foreclosing a mechanic's lien against an innocent
general contractor's retainage account in seeking compensation for delinquent
trust fund contributions that the defaulting subcontractor was obligated to pay. It
reasoned that such action would have compelled the general contractor to fulfill
the subcontractor's "duty under federal law to make payments to its
[subcontractor's] unionized employees' ERISA-governed benefit plans." Id. at
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628. The court concluded that to allow the union trust funds to collect against the
general contractor who was not obligated to make such contributions would be
regulating the funding of ERISA plans by "imposing liability upon general
contractors who have not agreed to make contributions to ERISA funds." ] d at
627. The court held that this would cause a "relation to" ERISA and should
therefore be preempted. |a\
Like Trig Electric, the ERISA Trust Funds in the case at hand are
organized "under the ambit of ERISA." Therefore, Trig Electric establishes sound
reasoning and precedent that the ERISA Trust Funds should be barred from filing
and foreclosing a mechanic's lien under the Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute
because such action would constitute a "relation to" ERISA and be preempted.
See also Harmon City. Inc. v. Nielsen & Senior. 907 P.2d 1162, 1168 (Utah
1995) (stating that the Tenth Circuit recognizes that a category of law that has
been held to "relate to" ERISA and therefore is preempted is a law t h a t " . . .
create[s].. . funding .. . requirements for ERISA plans").
B.

THE ERISA TRUST FUNDS' LIEN CLAIM UNDER UTAH'S
MECHANIC'S LIEN STATUTE IS PREEMPTED BY ERISA
BECAUSE SUCH ACTION WOULD PROVIDE TO THEM AN
ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF COLLECTION ABOVE AND BEYOND
THE REMEDIES PROVIDED BY ERISA.

Under ERISA, trust funds are allowed one avenue for collection. Allowing
the ERISA Trust Funds to also utilize the Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute to
recover benefit contributions would be contrary to ERISA. Such would be
providing them an alternative means of collection in addition to the remedies
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provided by ERISA. Appellants' primary argument in asserting that the ERISA
Trust Funds' claim is not preempted by ERISA is that the U.S. Supreme Court
"substantially" limited ERISA preemption in New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.. 514 U.S. 645 (1995). However,
a careful reading of Travelers reveals that the scope of ERISA preemption was
not "substantially" limited, but rather the test for preemption was simply clarified.
In Travelers, the court recognized that ERISA's "relate to" language is
"clearly expansive." Travelers. 514 U.S. at 655. The court then referred to its
earlier test for ERISA preemption as outlined in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.. 463
U.S. 85 (1983) by stating, "In Shaw, we explained that 'a law 'relates to' an
employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase if it has a connection
with or reference to such a plan.'" Travelers. 514 U.S. at 656 (quoting Shaw. 463
U.S. at 96-97). The court then quickly resolved the "reference to" prong by
concluding that there was nothing in the statute at issue that explicitly referred to
an ERISA plan. Id. 514 U.S. at 656. However, the court acknowledged difficulty
in determining the "connection with" portion of ihe test. ]d. The court concluded
that "We must simply go beyond the unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty of
defining its key term, and look instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a
guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive." ]d.
Thus, the new test for analyzing ERISA preemption is whether the statute
references an ERISA plan or whether it is somehow connected to ERISA, which
is determined by looking both to the objectives of ERISA as well as to the nature

3121 03

oy

of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans. California Div. of Labor Standards
Enforcement v. Dillingham Const. N.A., Inc.. 519 U.S. 316 (1997).
Thus, there is no indication in Travelers that the U.S. Supreme Court
"substantially limited the scope of ERISA preemption" as is asserted by
Appellants. This is further evidenced by the fact that in Travelers, the court did
not overrule its prior ERISA preemption decisions, but actually acknowledged
those cases' continuing validity. The court stated,
"[W]e do not hold today that ERISA pre-empts only direct regulation
of ERISA plans, nor could we do that with fidelity to the views
expressed in our prior opinions on the matter. See, e.g. IngersollRand. 498 U.S. at 139, 111 S.Ct. at 483: Pilot Life Is. Co. v.
Dedeaux. 481 U.S. 41, 47-48, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1552-1553, 95
LEd.2d 39 (1987); Shaw. 463 U.S., at 98, 103 S.Ct., at 2900
(emphasis added)."
Travelers. 514 U.S. at 668. Thus, Appellants' conclusion that the U.S. Supreme
Court in Travelers "rejected its holding in prior cases that ERISA preemption is to
be construed broadly" is inaccurate. (Brief of Appellant at 21) Otherwise, the
court would have abrogated its earlier ERISA preemption decisions. Thus, it
follows that the ERISA Trust Funds' claim is preempted by ERISA.
Furthermore, Appellants' conclusion that "Under Travelers, state laws are
preempted only where Congress has expressed a 'clear and manifest purpose' to
preempt such laws" is also inaccurate. (Brief of Appellant at 21) Specifically, the
Travelers court stated, "Elsewhere, we have held that state laws providing
alternative enforcement mechanisms also relate to ERISA plans, triggering
preemption." Travelers. 514 U.S. at 658. The court in Travelers reemphasized
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the well-settled principle that laws that create an alternative mechanism for relief
in addition to those established by ERISA are preempted.
This principle was upheld in a post-Travelers decision, EkIecCo v. Iron
Workers Union Sec. Funds. 170 F.3d 353 (2d. Cir. 1999). In EkIecCo, union trust
funds filed a lien against the property on which union members had been
laboring after the union contractor employing them defaulted on benefit
contributions. ]g\ at 355. The lien was brought under section 3 of the New York
Lien Law, which stated that trust funds are entitled to lien remedies. jcL at 35556. In considering this action, the court held that "Insofar as section 3 of the New
York Lien Law allows the placing of a mechanic's lien to secure employee
benefits protected under ERISA, section 3 is preempted." ]d. at 356. The court
based this holding on the fact that the statute creates an alternative enforcement
mechanism that makes the property owner liable for the defaulting contractor's
ERISA obligations. ] d at 357.
This conclusion is identical to numerous other jurisdictions that have found
that actions under state mechanic's lien laws for the recovery of ERISA funds are
preempted. See Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 46 v.
Trig Electric Constr. Co.. 13 P.3d 622 (Wash. 2000); Plumbing Indus. Bd.,
Plumbing Local Union No. 1 v. E.W. Howell Co., Inc.. 126 F.3d 61 (2d. Cir.
1997); Puget Sound Elec. Workers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Merit Co., 870
P.2d 960 (1994); Chestnut-Adams Ltd. Partnership v. Bricklayers & Masons
Trust Funds of Boston, Mass., 612 N.E.2d 236 (Mass. 1993); McCoy v.
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Massachusetts Inst, of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, (1 st Cir.1991); Carpenters S.
California Admin. Corp., v. El Capitan Dev. Co., 811 P.2d 296 (Cal. 1991); Iron
Workers Mid-South Pension Fund v. Terotechnology Corp., 891 F.2d 548 (5th Cir.
1990); Edwards v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.. 554 N.E.2d 833 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990);
Prestridge v. Shinault, 552 So.2d 643 (La.Ct.App.1989)
Except for Edwards, Trig Electric and Puget Sound, the mechanic's lien
statutes in the above-mentioned cases expressly allow trust funds to file a lien.
Nevertheless, the courts all found that the claims were preempted by ERISA. In
looking at the Utah statute, on its face, Section 38-1-3 does not expressly allow
trust funds to file a lien. Such is the case with "general application" analogous to
the statutes in Edwards, Trig Electric and Puget Sound which likewise concluded
preemption by ERISA. If the Trust Funds were permitted to file a lien in this
matter, Section 38-1-3, by implication, would essentially be incorporating the
statutory provisions similar to those found in the above-referenced cases that
allow trust funds to file a lien. This would narrow its general application and
imply an ostensible provision that would otherwise fall within the realm of state
law preempted by ERISA. Thus, each of the aforementioned cases serves as
sound precedence in concluding that the ERISA Trust Funds should not be
allowed to avail itself of relief provided by the Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute. Any
other conclusion would contradict ERISA.
Appellants further imply that the "alternative remedy" analysis does not
conflict with ERISA. They also state that "the mere fact that a state statute
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creates a remedy that is not mentioned in ERISA does not render such statute
preempted." (Brief of Appellant at 24) This assertion is flawed considering that
ERISA has "mentioned" a remedy. It explicitly provides for civil enforcement
remedies for non-payment of required benefit contributions. See 29 U.S.C.A. §§
1132, 1145 (2006).8 Appellants rely on Mackev v. Lanier Collection Agency &
Service, Inc.. 486 U.S. 825 (1988) in reaching this conclusion. However, the
court in Carpenters S. California Admin. Corp., v. El Capitan Dev. Co., 811 P.2d
296 (Cal. 1991), set forth an accurate analysis of the manner in which Mackev
differs from the instant issue by stating,
Mackev's analysis of Georgia's general garnishment
procedures does not save [California's trust fund lien statute] from
preemption. The decision concerned a third party action for
enforcement of judgments against beneficiaries of an ERISA plan.
ERISA does not contain remedial provisions for such actions.
Largely for this reason, the United States Supreme Court concluded
that "state-law methods for collecting money judgments must, as a
general matter, remain undisturbed by ERISA; otherwise, there
would be no way to enforce such a judgment won against an ERISA
plan." (Mackev, supra, 486 U.S. at 834). The present case is not
similar because ERISA expressly provides remedies for recovery of
delinquent contributions to employee benefit plans.
Furthermore, in holding that the Georgia garnishment statute
was not preempted, the high court noted that the statute "create[d]
no substantive causes of action, nor new bases for relief, or any
grounds for recovery; [it] does not create the rule of decision in any
case affixing liability." (Mackev, supra, 486 U.S. at 834). In contrast,
California's trust fund lien statute does more than provide a new
enforcement mechanism for collecting judgments; it creates new
substantive rights. [It] permits the creditor (the trust fund) to enforce
a debt (for outstanding fringe benefit contributions) not against the
8

Incidentally, the Appellants utilized ERISA's civil enforcement provisions in their
initial action in this matter wherein they garnished Western States Electric's
wages from Bovis.
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debtor (the defaulting employer), but against the property of a third
party that is not a party to the collective bargaining agreement. [It]
gives a trust fund a right to a lien against the property of third parties,
such as El Capitan, that the fund would not, and does not, have
under ERISA. In the absence of [California's trust fund lien statute],
El Capitan would have no liability to the funds for the fringe benefit
contributions. Therefore, [California's trust fund lien statute] cannot
be upheld under Mackev as it creates a new substantive right
against the property of a third party that is not created by ERISA
and, thus, goes beyond being a mere means of enforcing a
judgment."
El Capitan. 811 P.2d at 304.
It is appropriate to apply the same analysis in the present case. To hold
Appellees liable for WSE's ERISA obligations through the application of Utah's
Mechanic's Lien Statute creates a "new substantive right against a third party"
that the ERISA Trust Funds would not otherwise have under the provisions of
ERISA.
In Trig Electric, the court likewise concluded that the public lien statute "'...
directly or indirectly invade[s] the core functions of ERISA regulation' by providing
a civil enforcement mechanism beyond what Congress specified in ERISA." Trig
Electric, 13 P.3d at 626. The 10th Circuit also recognized that "[l]aws that have
been ruled preempted are those that provide an alternative cause of action to
employees to collect benefits protected by E R I S A . . . . " Monarch Cement
Company v. Lone Star Industries. 982 F.2d 1448, 1452 (10th Cir. 1992).
As prohibited in Trig Electric, if the ERISA Trust Funds were permitted to
foreclose a lien under Utah's Mechanic's Lien Statute, they would be attempting
to take advantage of an alternative mechanism for collection outside ERISA. The
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ERISA Trust Funds' intent to do this is manifested by their initial action in this
matter. Prior to filing its mechanic's lien, the ERISA Trust Funds sued WSE,
specifically under ERISA, for unpaid contributions. (See Complaint filed against
WSE ffll 1, 4, 8, 15, 16, and 20 wherein the ERISA Trust Funds cite references to
ERISA as the basis for their claims and authority. R. 680 - 687). The ERISA
Trust Funds obtained a judgment and garnished monies from Bovis for these
prior unpaid contributions. (FoF fflfl 3-17)- It is undisputed that the ERISA Trust
Funds have alleged and established themselves as ERISA plan participants.
The ERISA Trust Funds understood this fact when they asserted the identical
ERISA-supported claim in their prior lawsuit based on specific ERISA provisions
as being the appropriate course of action to seek remedial measures. However,
now that WSE filed bankruptcy, the ERISA Trust Funds have changed their
course and are seeking alternative remedies. They are now improperly
attempting to take advantage of Utah's Mechanic's Lien Statute to support their
efforts to collect trust fund contributions. This attempt demonstrates that the
ERISA Trust Funds are trying to take advantage of two different means of
collection which is prohibited as set forth in Trig Electric.
The Fifth Circuit has also confirmed that lien rights are not appropriate
where federal provisions for collection are provided by stating as follows:
Although a state law providing for mechanic's liens is a special
statutory collection alternative, that remedy cannot be divorced from
the substantive contractual rights which create the debt. To be
effective, the lien claim depends upon the validity and consequences
of an agreement of some sort. In this instance, a labor agreement is
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the subject matter. Failure of one party to the plan to make
contributions results in the denial of benefits to the others. Federal
remedies are provided. Mechanics' lien rights are omitted.
Iron Workers Mid-South Pension Fund v. Terotechnoloqy Corp.. 891 F.2d 548,
554 (5th Cir. 1990). Like Iron Workers, the case at hand deals with a "denial of
benefits" governed by federal remedies. The sound rationale of the Fifth Circuit
along with Trig Electric should be applied in this matter denying ERSIA Trust
Funds' attempt to take advantage of alternative means of collection. The ERISA
Trust Funds mechanic's lien claim should, therefore, be "omitted." See also
Travelers Ins. Co.. 514 U.S. at 1678 (wherein the Supreme Court states,". ..
[W]e have held that state laws providing alternative enforcement mechanisms
also relate to ERISA plans, triggering pre-emption"); see also Harmon City. Inc..
907 P.2d at 1170 (in holding that ERISA pre-emption was unavailable to the
plaintiffs, the court reasoned that "[P]laintiffs here are not employees resorting to
state law to avail themselves of an alternative cause of action to collect benefits
under a plan"); see also Iron Workers Mid-South Pension Fund. 891 F.2d at 555
(holding that "The Louisiana Private Works Act is therefore preempted because it
attempts to supplement the exclusive civil remedies provided by ERISA").
Specifically, a mechanic's lien statute that expressly allows plaintiffs to file
a mechanic's lien "relates to" and is preempted by ERISA due to establishing an
alternative mechanism for collection. Carpenters S. California Admin. Corp.. v.
El Capitan Dev. Co.. 811 P.2d 296 (Cal. 1991). In El Capitan. the administrator
of multi-employer plaintiffs had a collective bargaining agreement with a
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particular subcontractor who failed to make fringe benefit contributions. ]dL at
297-298. The plaintiff filed a lien against the property where the insolvent
subcontractor was working pursuant to a California statute. The statute
expressly allows for trust funds organized according to a collective bargaining
agreement to file a lien for unpaid contributions. JcL at 297. The court held that
the lien filed by the plaintiff was preempted by ERISA because section 3111 of
the California Code creates " . . . an additional cause of action for enforcing
contribution obligations by making an additional entity liable for such
contributions." ig^at 299.
Furthermore, courts have ruled that even where a state's mechanic's lien
statute is not found to "relate to" ERISA, it is nonetheless pre-empted by ERISA
in that it impermissibly provides an alternative cause of action. Plumbing Indus.
Bd., Plumbing Local Union No. 1 v. E.W. Howell Co.. Inc.. 126 F.3d 61 (2d Cir.
1997). In Plumbing Industry Board, the defendant contracted to build a public
school and hired a subcontractor to do mechanical work. The subcontractor
defaulted on fringe benefit payments it owed .under a collective bargaining
agreement. The plaintiff, acting as the union benefit plan's trustee, filed a lien
against the funds established to pay for the school's construction under the New
York Lien Law. Said law allows workers on public projects and "any trust fund to
which benefits and wage supplements are due or payable for the benefit of such
person performing labor" to pursue a lien action for the value of the labor
provided against the money designated to fund the public project in question. ]g\
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at 67. Notwithstanding its conclusion that New York's statute did not "relate to"
ERISA, the court held that it was preempted because i t " . . . provides an
alternative mechanism - filing a lien that attached to improvements - for
enforcing the rights protected by ERISA . . .." ]d. at 68. The court further
concluded that by requiring the general contractor to assume the subcontractor's
responsibility of benefit payments, "the state law impermissibly adds to the
exclusive list of parties ERISA holds responsible for an employer's benefit
obligations." i d at 69.
Thus, even if it is determined that the ERISA Trust Funds were eligible to
file a lien in this matter and conclude that the claim is not "related to" ERISA,
such an action is nonetheless barred. The ERISA Trust Funds' self-proclaimed
status as ERISA plan participants, their previous efforts in seeking recovery in
this matter as such, and their current contradictory claim of seeking multiple
avenues of relief through Utah's Mechanic's Lien Statute and Private
Contractor's Bond Statues are not permitted under ERISA.
Based on the foregoing„ allowing the ERISA Trust Funds to file and
foreclose a mechanic's lien would be providing them multiple alternative means
of recovery.9 Accordingly, Utah's Mechanic's Lien Statute is preempted by

9

Plaintiffs cite Laborers' Trust Funds v. Maui Prince Hotel, 918 p.2d 1143 (Haw.
1996) in substantiating their argument that "most" courts have held that states
mechanic's lien statutes are not preempted by ERISA. It is worth noting,
however, that the Maui Prince Hotel court failed to conduct a thorough
"alternative remedy" analysis. Therefore, it is Appellees' contention that because
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ERISA "insofar" as it would allow extraneous entities like the ERISA Trust Funds
to file a mechanic's lien. Furthermore, by construing Utah's Mechanic's Lien
Statute to permit the ERISA Trust Funds to file a lien would render it similar to
the statutes in El Capitan and Plumbing Industry Board, thereby strengthening
the argument for preemption.
C.
THE ERISA TRUST FUNDS' LIEN CLAIM UNDER UTAH'S
MECHANIC'S LIEN STATUTE IS PREEMPTED BY ERISA BECAUSE
SUCH ACTION WOULD AFFORD THEM SPECIAL TREATMENT.
Finally, if the ERISA Trust Funds were afforded the opportunity to utilize
Utah's Mechanic's Lien Statute in addition to the remedies provided by ERISA,
the ERISA Trust Funds would be receiving additional special treatment not
afforded to ERISA plan participants. Specifically, in El Capitan, the court
explained that "ERISA plans do not furnish labor or materials for construction
projects . . . [and] to treat them as persons who do furnish labor or materials is to
single them out for special treatment." El Capitan, 811 P.2d at 300.
Like El Capitan, the ERISA Trust Funds in no way furnished labor or
materials to tbe Project. Allowing them to file and foreclose a mechanic's lien
under Utah's Mechanic's Lien Statute, would render them recipients of special
treatment. It would allow the ERISA Trust Funds to utilize both a state and
federal means of collection. Simply put, by allowing ERISA Trust Funds this
additional right of recovery above and beyond the provisions set forth by ERISA

Maui Prince Hotel failed to analyze a key element in determining ERISA
preemption it should not be relied upon in this matter.
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- provisions they so heavily relied upon in their initial ERISA lawsuit against
WSE - would lead to the distortion of ERISA's purpose.
Appellants also argue that ERISA's legislative history indicates that
Congress did not intend for ERISA to supersede state mechanic's lien laws.
(Brief of Appellant at 25) However, the Edwards court addressed this issue by
stating:
The question whether a certain state action'is pre-empted by federal
law is one of congressional intent. The purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone.' We have observed in the past that the express pre-emption
provisions of ERISA are deliberately expansive, and designed to 'establish
pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern.'
The bill that became ERISA originally contained a limited preemption clause, applicable only to state laws relating to the specific
subjects covered by ERISA. The Conference Committee rejected those
provisions in favor of the present language, and indicated that section's
pre-emptive scope was as broad as its language.
The conclusion that fSection 1132(a)] [of ERISA] was intended to
be exclusive is supported, first, by the language and structure of the civil
enforcement provisions, and second, by legislative history in which
Congress declared that the pre-emptive force of [1132] was modeled on
the exclusive remedy provided by 301 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185.
The policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and
the exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be completely
undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to
obtain remedies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA.
The deliberate care with which ERISA's civil enforcement remedies
were drafted and the balancing of policies embodied in its choice of
remedies argue strongly for the conclusion that ERISA's civil enforcement
remedies were intended to be exclusive. This conclusion is fully confirmed
by the legislative history of the civil enforcement provision.
Edwards. 554 N.E.2d at 836.
The fact that Congress provided for civil remedies for ERISA plans
indicates that in order to maintain ERISA's purpose of "ensuring] that [ERISA]
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plans .. . would be subject to a uniform body of benefits law . . . [by] minimizing]
the administrative and financial burden of complying with conflicting directives . . .
between States and the Federal Government," Inqersoll-Rand Company v.
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133,142 (1990), the civil enforcement remedies under
ERISA were meant to be exclusive. Thus, allowing ERISA funds to utilize state
mechanic's lien laws (which might possibly conflict as between different states) to
hold innocent third parties such as Bovis liable for the ERISA obligations of
another party "conflicts" with the intent with which ERISA was created.
In summary, affording the ERISA Trust Funds special treatment by
allowing them to collect compensation under Utah's Mechanic's Lien Statute
when remedies are specifically provided for them under ERISA misconstrues
ERISA's purpose. The ERISA Trust Funds' lien claim is therefore preempted.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing argument, Appellees request the Court affirm
the decision of the District Court

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES
Appellees further request an award to Appellees for their attorney fees and
costs incurred with this appeal.
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